

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

**Joseph R. Cerami**

The dominant trend within universities and think tanks is toward ever-narrowing specialization: a higher premium is placed on functioning deeply within a single field than broadly across several. And yet without some awareness of the whole—without some sense of how means converge to accomplish or to frustrate ends—there can be no strategy. And without strategy there is only drift.

Paul Kennedy and  
John Lewis Gaddis  
Yale University

Advice to strategists comes in many forms. Kennedy and Gaddis's thoughts expressed above are representative of most scholars, statesmen, and generals—strategy is a critical subject for senior leaders. George Marshall expressed concerns, late in his distinguished career, that as a statesman he had to learn a “whole new set of skills.” Theater strategists, like Field Marshall Slim, have written that senior leaders must learn how to “think big.” Important books on the subject stress an in depth knowledge of history, economics, politics, geography, culture, and so on. For a concept that remains hard to define, the study of strategy remains a complex subject of lifelong learning for scholars, statesmen, and soldiers alike.

For more than three decades the Army War College (AWC) Department of National Security and Strategy has faced the challenge of educating future strategic leaders on the subject of National Security, or Grand Strategy. Fitting at the top of an officer's or government official's career-long, professional development program, the challenge has been to design a course on strategy that incorporates its many facets, in a short period of time, all within the one-year, senior service college curriculum. To do this, a conceptual approach has provided the framework to think about strategy formulation. The purpose of this volume is to present the Army War College's strategy formulation model to students and practitioners. This book serves as a guide to one method for the formulation, analysis and study of strategy—an approach which we have found to be useful in providing generations of strategists with the conceptual tools to think systematically, strategically, critically, creatively and big. Balancing what is described in the following chapters as ends, ways, and means—remains at the core of the Army War College's approach to national security and military strategy and strategy formulation.

Each of the following chapters highlights a major concept used in our strategy formulation model. All of the authors have been on the faculty at one of the nation's armed forces, senior service colleges. They have structured their essays to focus on concepts that have been developed, debated, and tested for use in small group seminars, in an adult learning environment. The majority of these chapters have been used effectively as required readings

for the core strategy course. Several have been written especially for this book, to fill in some of the gaps for explaining the strategy making process. The authors are drawn from several academic fields, including international relations, government, public policy and, of course, history. Several have also had high-level experience working as strategists at the White House, in the Pentagon, and in joint and multinational, theater headquarters. The combined effect is a book that is academic in its focus on concepts and theoretical approaches, yet practical in the sense of being intended as a working guide for strategists. Each chapter also serves as material to guide seminar discussion, to focus debate, and to define what we believe are the key concepts in the study and formulation of strategy. While the strategic environment is dynamic and complex, our experience has been that these concepts are a most useful foundation for practitioners and scholars of national security strategy and defense policy.

## **CHAPTER 2: A PRIMER IN STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT— ROBERT H. DORFF.**

In this chapter, Robert Dorff presents the core of the strategy formulation model, what we call the “ends, ways, and means” of strategy. Grand strategy and national security strategy are defined. Key concepts for the study of strategy are introduced, including brief discussions of foundation concepts, such as, values, interests, threats, challenges, national security strategy and risk assessments. The chapter ends with a comparison of current, alternative approaches for U.S. national security strategy. The concepts and themes introduced in Chapter 2 are developed in greater depth in the remainder of the book.

## **CHAPTER 3: ETHICAL ISSUES IN WAR: AN OVERVIEW— MARTIN L. COOK.**

Martin Cook’s essay provides background on the limits, constraints, and criteria that have evolved regarding the use of violence by states and societies. Chapter 3 includes a review of just war thinking and the general history of Western legal and ethical thought. Cook notes the open questions regarding cultural diversity, especially in what many call the age of globalization. How Western thought converges and diverges from other cultural and ethical traditions, customs and laws should be an important area for seminar discussions and future research. This Chapter includes the just war framework and criteria, and highlights the importance of developing a strategist’s understanding of the moral structure of just decisions in going to war, as well as just conduct in war.

## **CHAPTER 4: SOME BASIC CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS—ROBERT H. DORFF.**

In Chapter 4, Robert Dorff introduces the essential concepts used by international relations scholars to help understand, analyze and explain state behavior. His primary focus

is on the nation-state and how perceptions of values and interests influence their behavior in the international environment. The chapter's main focus is on describing and expanding Waltz's three levels of analysis—the system, the state, and the individual. The reader also is introduced to realist and idealist worldviews, and related concepts involving neorealism, anarchy, the security dilemma, balance of power, Wilsonianism, and international institutionalism. Other key foundation concepts the chapter addresses include, sovereignty, nationalism, and inter and nongovernmental organizations. Dorff stresses the importance of integrating the levels of analysis in strategic thinking. He also emphasizes the importance of understanding the competing views and assumptions used when explaining nation state behavior. The notion of how the concept of national interest serves to shape international relations and security is introduced in Chapter 4, and expanded in much greater depth in Chapters 5 and 6.

## **CHAPTER 5: THE PERSISTENCE OF CREDIBILITY: INTERESTS, THREATS AND PLANNING FOR THE USE OF AMERICAN MILITARY POWER—DAVID JABLONSKY.**

David Jablonsky presents the first of two chapters on the concept of national interest. Jablonsky's realist perspective emphasizes the link between interests and credibility, which he defines as a combination of both influence and will. This chapter introduces a framework for analyzing national interests in terms of two dimensions—categories and intensity. Categories of national interests include physical security, economic prosperity, values, and world order. He subdivides the concept of intensity of national interests into vital, important and peripheral. Jablonsky illustrates how using these two dimensions assists strategists in analyzing the national interest and developing national priorities. Chapter 5 also reviews the connections between national interest and the use of force. The Weinberger Doctrine is presented and compared with the succeeding debates about gray area challenges, as well as humanitarian values and interests. Jablonsky views the national interest as the key concept for prioritizing national security policy and maintaining long term consistency and clarity. Chapter 6 presents a different view.

## **CHAPTER 6: NATIONAL INTEREST: FROM ABSTRACTION TO STRATEGY—MICHAEL G. ROSKIN.**

In Chapter 6, Michael Roskin stresses the difficulty of turning national interest into a working strategy. He writes of the strategist's problems for using national interest to achieve an undistorted clarity, or provide the ability to anticipate the 2d and 3d order effects of policy options and decisions. Instead, Roskin sees national interest as a conceptual device most useful for defining arguments limiting the number of crusades a nation should engage in. Roskin reviews the concept in terms of the philosophies of Machiavelli and Clausewitz. He then briefly traces the American interpretations, starting with George Washington and the founding fathers, through Woodrow Wilson's legal-idealistic approach. He then writes of the shift in thinking among international relations experts in the 1930s, with the introduction of

the Realist School, spearheaded by Hans Morgenthau. Roskin provides a taxonomy for categorizing national interests in terms of importance, duration, specificity and compatibility. For Roskin, the primary challenge for strategists is in finding where different nations' interests are in competition and where they are complementary. Roskin also points out what he calls the warping effects on using national interest for strategy formulation. He includes ideology, global systemic effects, public and elite convictions, mass media, and bureaucratic policy inertia. These barriers, or constraints, are significant when attempting innovative and radical approaches. Finally, Roskin concludes that the concept of national interest is most useful for training analysts in asking good questions. Questions that are necessary for strategists to focus on the use and limits of power, the true intensity of interests, the will to use power, as well as the flexibility for maneuver and compromise. The comparison of the Jablonsky and Roskin essays should provide ample room for seminar discussions about the utility and problems of using the concept of national interest in strategy formulation.

## **CHAPTER 7: REGIONAL STUDIES AND GLOBAL STRATEGY— R. CRAIG NATION.**

Craig Nation writes of the importance of the New Regionalism in strategic studies. In Chapter 7, Nation argues that the emergence of regional issues have redefined the security environment of the 21st Century. This new configuration of global power requires strategists who have a more sophisticated understanding of regional and national political, social, and cultural processes. The challenge for strategists is to integrate regional perspectives, with a sensitivity to regional and national dynamics; including geographic, social, cultural and religious, as well as military dimensions. Nation describes the ways that regional affairs condition the global security agenda and channel and constrain U.S. priorities that affect the contours of world order. Four reasons he cites include regional sources of instability and conflict; geopolitics; cultural dimensions of warfare; and regional alliances and associations. Chapter 7 discusses Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis, and the writings on geopolitics by Mackinder, Mahan, and Spykman. Regarding the military dimension of strategy, Nation writes about the issues surrounding rogue and failed states, civil wars, and complex and small-scale contingencies. Chapter 7 emphasizes the significance of the Army War College's core course on Regional Strategic Appraisals, and the importance of a New Regionalism in balancing a global approach to international strategic studies.

## **CHAPTER 8: NATIONAL POWER—DAVID JABLONSKY.**

Strategist's understanding of the elements and instruments of national power are key to strategy formulation. David Jablonsky's chapter takes the reader back to Thomas Hobbes and the Realist's School of international relations—the primacy of self-help in an anarchic international system. Key to Jablonsky's treatment is an appreciation for the multidimensional nature of the elements of power. In this chapter the author emphasizes the dynamic, situational and relational aspects of power with respect to the interactions of state and nonstate actors. Jablonsky discusses both the natural and social determinants of power. Natural determinants include geography, resources and population. The social determinants

include the states' economic, political, military, psychosocial, and information systems. He discusses emerging trends and their potential impact for U.S. defense and foreign policy regarding the growing complexity of power relations among nation-states and international actors. The author is careful to point out that strategy formulation remains more art than science and he highlights the importance of qualitative factors in strategy formulation. These include the importance of subjective perceptions of national power, purpose, and will. Jablonsky also provides a framework for gain and risk assessments. Focusing on the elements and instruments of national power provides a conceptual tool for linking means, ways and ends—an essential link in the strategy formulation process. In sum, national power is the concept that helps define the instruments used by a variety of government organizations to achieve the national interest, as derived from national values. Jablonsky concludes by noting how a deep understanding of the complexity of national power helps teach flexible thinking, which he calls the *sine qua non* for strategists.

## **CHAPTER 9: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS: FORWARD INTO THE 21ST CENTURY— GABRIEL MARCELLA.**

Gabriel Marcella describes the complexity of governmental policymaking in Chapter 9. Marcella defines the interagency process as the use of all of the nation's instruments of power, as coordinated by the national security staffs of a variety of government agencies, into a coherent and effective national security policy. The challenge for strategists is to insure the intellectual integration of the nation's power to achieve a unity of effort within the U.S. government. Marcella discusses the history of the U.S. government's efforts at achieving what is called purposeful adaptation, in the Post World War II era. He reviews the foundation of the National Security Council (NSC), as legislated by the National Security Act of 1947. The chapter describes the NSC policymaking structure of principals and deputies committees, and interagency working groups. The chapter also examines the presidential policy and decision directive processes. Included is a section comparing the various cultures that stereotype the perceived differences in organizational and individual behaviors. Key for strategists is developing an appreciation for the fact that no one agency resolves any issue in today's complex security environment. Marcella also examines the interagency process at the operational level, including the roles and functions of the ambassadors, the embassy country team, and the regional military commanders. For students of national security policymaking, Marcella stresses the importance of the interagency process, as well as the growing significance of multinational coalitions. The strategist's skill sets for facing the challenges of the 21st Century should include an appreciation of working effectively in international diplomacy and negotiations, as well as within the domestic, interagency process of governmental networks and bureaucracy.

## **CHAPTER 10: THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: DOCUMENTING STRATEGIC VISION—DON SNIDER AND JOHN A. NAGL.**

Former NSC staffer, Don Snider, and co-author, John Nagl, provide an in-depth analysis of the product that, since 1987, has been the official, presidential document for defining U.S. national security strategy. The authors describe the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, and the congressional requirement for a written national security, or grand strategy. Snider and Nagl agree with previous authors on the utility of grand strategy—to coherently integrate all the resources of national power for mid and long term strategy to define and further U.S. national interests. In addition, they address the political context of defense reform and the problems of executive and legislative branch cooperation, especially in periods of gridlock and adversarial politics. Nevertheless, National Security Strategies have been written and published and viewed as authoritative statements of the nation's grand strategy. The authors point out the documents five key purposes to communicate the President's strategic vision to Congress; to key constituents; to foreign and domestic audiences; to solidify an intergovernmental consensus on foreign and defense policy; and to contribute substance in the administration's overall agenda. Chapter 10 briefly reviews the major attributes and shifts in the NSS documents from 1987 to the current version, spanning the Reagan, Bush and Clinton presidencies. Snider and Nagl note the simple elegance of the three overriding goals for national security strategy during the Clinton era—enhancing security, promoting prosperity and promoting democracy. Chapter 10 ends with a brief discussion of the remaining debates regarding the utility of the NSS documents. Remaining issues include the difficulties of developing grand strategy in light of divided government, and the lack of an executive branch organization for conducting long range planning in a substantive, systematic manner. They also note the tendency for national level strategists to focus on crisis management and near term policy development and implementation. Given the complexity of the interagency process as described in the previous chapter, Snider and Nagl have presented strategists with significant challenges. These include developing and maintaining an overarching strategy and strategic vision to provide an azimuth and prevent the drift that concerns Kennedy and Gaddis. This is of course more difficult when engaged in day to day operations that in effect serve to shape the current and future security environments. The additional problem of developing an organizational capacity for grand strategy and long-range planning remains to be solved.

## **CHAPTER 11: WHY IS STRATEGY DIFFICULT? —DAVID JABLONSKY.**

In Chapter 11, Jablonsky explores the important question of why strategy remains the most difficult of all. Here he develops the idea of strategy as an art, a creative activity. Several key concepts are introduced. One is the policy continuum, as the relationship of policy, strategy and tactics. Another is the modern era's notion of grand strategy as a nation's balancing of ends-ways-means in the complex construct represented as including vertical (strategic, operational and tactical) and horizontal (economic, psychological, political and military) dimensions. In this section, Jablonsky further discusses Clausewitz's prescription, that war is a continuation of politics with the addition of other means. Clausewitz's remarkable trinity, which has evolved into an American Trinitarian approach (including the

army, the government and the people), is also introduced. Jablonsky's historical review includes the impact of the Industrial and French Revolutions, and how the transformations of technology and politics forever changed the modern conception of national security and military strategy. Chapter 11 provides essential background reading for current discussions regarding the Revolution in Military Affairs, the influence of Information Age technology, and ongoing efforts at military transformation and innovation.

## **CHAPTER 12: FORCE PLANNING AND U.S. DEFENSE POLICY— JOHN F. TROXELL.**

The examination of military strategy continues in Chapter 12. John F. Troxell focuses more directly on the subjects of defense policy and strategy, and military force planning. Force planning is defined as determining the force structure of the right size and composition to achieve a nation's security goals. Troxell prescribes key tasks for force planners in recommending how much force structure, how much risk to accept, how to posture the force, and how to defend their recommendations to the Congress and public. Chapter 12 includes an in depth discussion of the two dominant force planning methods—threat-based and capability-based concepts. Troxell reviews defense policy from the Truman through the Clinton Administrations and recounts the complexities of reconciling force structure with the defense policies and national security strategies of each period. Readers will find useful summaries of defense policy in the Cold War era. Troxell also examines post-Cold War defense policy and program reviews as well as the debates about the two major theater of war force planning requirements. The chapter ends with an important model for dynamic force planning that integrates both the threat and capability based approaches.

## **CHAPTER 13: TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF MILITARY STRATEGY—ARTHUR F. LYKKE, JR.**

Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., the father of the Army War College's ends, ways, and means strategy models, served on the AWC faculty for more than 20 years. It is no exaggeration to say that the simple elegance of his model, as expressed in this brief essay, influenced generations of strategic thinkers. The importance of the Lykke model became legendary among graduates in senior positions in the U.S. armed forces, as well as with the AWC's distinguished International Fellows, many of whom went on to lead their nation's military establishments. In Chapter 13 we have reproduced the Lykke article that simply lays out the ends, ways, means model of strategy. Lykke applies it to the subject of military strategy, while pointing out the model's utility for any and all kinds of strategies. The analysis of ends (or the objectives), ways (or courses of action), and means (or resources) is a concept useful at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. Important for strategists is Lykke's emphasis on the objective in strategy, and the distinction between political and military objectives. Central to the U.S. tradition of civil-military relations is Lykke's repetition of a familiar Clausewitzian concept—that policy drives strategy and that the political objectives must come first. The critical task then for military strategists is to understand the political objective and derive the military objectives, courses of action, and resources that provide the

military instrument, in conjunction with the other instruments of national power, as the means to achieve political ends. This simple construct is most complex when put into practice. We believe that mastering ends, ways, and means remains at the heart of strategy. Lykke encourages strategists to think long and hard about balancing ends, ways, and means as the core concept for strategy formulation.

## **CHAPTER 14: STRATEGIC RISK—JAMES F. HOLCOMB, JR.**

In Chapter 14, James Holcomb discusses a variety of aspects of the subject of strategic risk. Holcomb provides a review of risk as covered by several important modern strategists, including Liddell-Hart, Beaufre, Eccles, Wylie and Allison, as well as in chapters in this book by Lykke and Jablonsky. He also links the topic to foundational concepts on uncertainty, chance and genius, as found in Clausewitz's writing. Chapter 14 reviews several frameworks for risk assessment and management and includes a section from Neuchterlein's approach to assessing values and cost-risk factors in determining national interests. Included are sections on the CIA's suggested framework, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff readiness reporting system. Holcomb concludes with a brief case study on risk assessment, as applied to an analysis of the Kosovo bombing campaign. In the final analysis, risk assessment returns the reader to the beginning of this book, and to the fundamental strategic calculations regarding values, national interests, political and military objectives and, of course, ends, ways, and means.

## **CHAPTER 15: STRATEGIC ART: THE NEW DISCIPLINE FOR 21st CENTURY LEADERS—RICHARD A. CHILCOAT.**

The final chapter provides a capstone for this guide and addresses the importance of educating individual strategists. Chilcoat's chapter is a call for strategic thinkers to develop an approach to strategic art rivaling the mid-1980s development of operational art. By this point the reader will be familiar with the framework used to define the strategic art—as the skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends, ways, and means to promote and defend the national interests. The chapter addresses individual professional development and the importance of educating senior leaders for three interrelated roles—as strategic leaders, practitioners and theorists. The complex challenges facing post Cold War strategists are evaluated in light of the required skills, knowledge and abilities, as described in case studies contrasting the conventional Persian Gulf War with unconventional peace operations in Bosnia. Chilcoat concludes by pointing out three trends that face strategists in the new global era. These are first, an understanding of adult learning; second, appreciating the utilization of technology; and third, expanding conceptual horizons. Chilcoat also addresses the importance of civil-military relations, as well as the difficulty of wargaming and simulating the political-military environment of today's shifting strategic landscape. Chapter 15 provides important ideas and poses significant questions for those engaged in security studies, and especially those engaged in the professional development of strategic leaders at all levels of the armed forces.



## **APPENDIX I: GUIDELINES FOR STRATEGY.**

Appendix I is copied from the AWC's core strategy course directive. In the appendix the reader will find an outline of the strategy formulation model and working definitions. Definitions are presented for ease of reference on the key concepts of national values, national interests, strategic appraisals, national policy, national strategy, military strategy, and risk assessment. Naturally, for an in-depth discussion of the concepts the reader is referred to the appropriate chapters.

## **APPENDIX II: U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY: A BIBLIOGRAPHY—JANE GIBISH.**

A bibliography for strategists is provided in Appendix II. Jane Gibish, of the Army War College Library, compiled this bibliography. The list includes both classic and current works. The editors of this volume want to express their sincere thanks to the AWC Library staff, under the leadership of Mr. Bohdan Kohutiak. The AWC Library remains a cornerstone for the research into the study of national security strategy at Carlisle Barracks.

The editors and authors acknowledge that this book is not a complete coverage of all of the subject matter related to the study of strategy. In fact, the treatment of strategy formulation found here is only one aspect of the AWC's intensive, two-month, core strategy course. For those involved in designing courses on grand strategy, the importance of including history and case studies cannot be overstated. It is also not possible to develop an in-depth appreciation for strategy without studying the material found in the other two AWC core courses. These courses cover the equally complex subjects of Strategic Leadership and Management, and Military Planning and Operations. Of course, our parochial view is that strategy is most important and must come first. So, consider this volume a starting point, as well as a reference book. The U.S. Army War College's *Guide to Strategy* asks that the reader, as student, engage in the strategic thought process. The simple intent of this book is to contribute to your understanding of our approach to strategy formulation. If it helps you think conceptually, analytically, critically and creatively about the important issues surrounding national security, or grand strategy, then so much the better for the theory and practice of strategy. The ultimate measure of success of this book is in its utility for civilian and military strategists—those engaged in the challenge of working day-to-day policy issues, while keeping one eye on the evolving strategic landscape, and the other on defending and promoting the nation's security values and interests for the mid and long term.